Excellent analysis as usual. Could you look at Burma/Myanmar through a similar lens with China as the key stakeholder who has both the strategic and economic incentives to have a peaceful country on its borders?
Thank you, Bo. Burma/Myanmar is definitely a case I have considered. The governance vacancy pattern maps closely, and China's role along the border corridors adds a layer that fits the framework well. This may show up in the schedule.
China’s interests go far beyond the border area. It supports the Myanmar military because no one else can protect its interests beyond the border area. The access to the Indian Ocean is extremely important within the US-China rivalry. China hates the NUG as it sees it as aligned with the West.
Before the military coup in 2021, there were about 20 ethnic armed organizations, many with parallel governments. After the coup, there has been an additional 800+ armed groups. Myanmar is the eastern DRC and the Sahel on steroids.
This has been an intractable governance issue for 75+ years. No one inside and outside Myanmar has been able to resolve. Everyone looks to ASEAN and the West to do it, but the West has no power and confuses the issue with Western symmetrical federal models which does not work in a country that is extremely heterogeneous. China is the only stakeholder who has both the power and strategic interests to resolve the issue maybe through models you have reference in your writings.
If you want to really validate your governance perspective and help the people of Myanmar, look at it and see now the stakeholders inside Myanmar can work with China to bring peace to the country after 75 years. Throw away any bias toward the West..they are impotent and a red herring. If you can solve this one, you will have done want no one has been able to do.
Excellent analysis as usual. Could you look at Burma/Myanmar through a similar lens with China as the key stakeholder who has both the strategic and economic incentives to have a peaceful country on its borders?
Thank you, Bo. Burma/Myanmar is definitely a case I have considered. The governance vacancy pattern maps closely, and China's role along the border corridors adds a layer that fits the framework well. This may show up in the schedule.
China’s interests go far beyond the border area. It supports the Myanmar military because no one else can protect its interests beyond the border area. The access to the Indian Ocean is extremely important within the US-China rivalry. China hates the NUG as it sees it as aligned with the West.
Before the military coup in 2021, there were about 20 ethnic armed organizations, many with parallel governments. After the coup, there has been an additional 800+ armed groups. Myanmar is the eastern DRC and the Sahel on steroids.
This has been an intractable governance issue for 75+ years. No one inside and outside Myanmar has been able to resolve. Everyone looks to ASEAN and the West to do it, but the West has no power and confuses the issue with Western symmetrical federal models which does not work in a country that is extremely heterogeneous. China is the only stakeholder who has both the power and strategic interests to resolve the issue maybe through models you have reference in your writings.
If you want to really validate your governance perspective and help the people of Myanmar, look at it and see now the stakeholders inside Myanmar can work with China to bring peace to the country after 75 years. Throw away any bias toward the West..they are impotent and a red herring. If you can solve this one, you will have done want no one has been able to do.