Why the PLA Could Decide China’s Next Leader
Factional chess, economic tripwires, and the fragility at the heart of Xi’s succession plan
The People’s Liberation Army, not the Party, may decide China’s next leader. And it could happen sooner than anyone expects.
Editor’s note: This post was completed in early August, before the recent disappearances of senior diplomats Liu Jianchao and Sun Haiyan. Far from undermining this analysis, these events underscore its central argument: that succession uncertainty is deepening, and the PLA’s role as kingmaker is only growing.
BLUF: Xi’s grip masks a brittle succession system and three quiet shifts suggest the clock is ticking.
PLA positioning: PLA positioning: The July 2024 rotation of the Southern Theater Command signals both readiness and political maneuvering.
Economic tripwires: Provinces like Guizhou, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning are drowning in debt, pressuring the Party to favor technocrats over loyalists.
Media signals: People’s Daily has moved Li Qiang beside Xi in official photos, a classic CCP cue for political elevation.
If these trends converge, the People’s Liberation Army, not the Party, could decide who leads China next.
For all the talk of Xi Jinping’s iron grip, the ultimate arbiter of succession in the People’s Republic has often worn a uniform, not a suit. Mao Zedong’s chosen heirs only survived with military blessing. Deng Xiaoping could push through his picks because he had the generals. Jiang Zemin lasted after Tiananmen because the PLA closed ranks around him.
Xi has spent a decade purging the military, restructuring commands, and stacking the Central Military Commission (CMC) with loyalists. But in doing so, he has also stripped away many of the Party’s alternative power bases. If a sudden transition comes, the PLA’s institutional weight, and its control over the guns, would give it disproportionate sway over who steps in.
And here’s the fragility no one is talking about: the current Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) has an average age of 67.4, the oldest in PRC history. Several members would be in their seventies by the end of the first term as General Secretary. In a crisis, that means the only politically viable candidates could be younger figures without entrenched Party bases: precisely the kind of power vacuum in which the military becomes decisive.
The irony is that Xi’s strength is what created this instability. His anti‑corruption purges eliminated rivals and neutralized factions, but they also narrowed the field to a handful of loyalists and technocrats, most of them untested at the very top. That makes the system more brittle than it was under Mao, when multiple factions could at least check each other.
To understand the fault lines shaping that brittleness, here’s a map of the CCP’s main power blocs, and how the PLA connects them.
1. Why Xi's Succession Is Unlike Any Before
For decades, the CCP maintained an informal norm of grooming successors well before the leadership transition. Jiang Zemin identified Hu Jintao early; Hu did the same with Xi. This ensured a stable handover and minimized internal turbulence.
Xi has broken that pattern. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, no clear heir-apparent emerged. Instead, Xi packed the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) with trusted loyalists, many too old by party norms to be viable long-term successors, ensuring no one could challenge him prematurely.
This is not an oversight; it is deliberate. The longer the mystery endures, the more all factions remain dependent on Xi. Historical precedent also suggests Xi could change his mind more than once. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping cycled through multiple potential heirs, a "successor shuffle" that often destabilized elite politics and created openings for rivals.
The Break from Precedent
Unlike his predecessors, who signaled succession intentions 5 to 10 years in advance, Xi has:
Abolished term limits (2018), removing the institutional guardrail for succession timing
Purged potential rivals through anti-corruption campaigns, eliminating alternative power centers
Cultivated a personality cult reminiscent of Mao, making any successor appear diminished by comparison
Created new Party institutions (like the National Security Commission) that report directly to him, complicating any handover
Factional Mapping
While "loyalists vs. technocrats" is a helpful shorthand, CCP elite politics are more complex:
Loyalists/Xi Core: Officials whose careers are directly tied to Xi’s network in Fujian, Zhejiang, or the central Party apparatus
Technocrats: Policy-focused, less ideological leaders, often with professional or academic backgrounds
Communist Youth League (tuanpai): Once dominant under Hu Jintao, now diminished but still a potential compromise bloc
Shanghai Gang: Legacy Jiang Zemin network, largely sidelined but with residual influence in economic hubs
Factional lines are fluid, and ambitious politicians often straddle categories to broaden their support. Li Qiang, for example, could deepen technocratic credentials by spearheading economic recovery measures; Chen Jining could cultivate nationalist bona fides to court PLA sympathy.
2. The Succession Bench: A Generational Analysis
Below, the most likely successors to Xi, organized by time horizon, with their strengths, weaknesses, and factional flexibility.
3. The Hidden Architecture of Succession
PLA as Kingmaker
Western analysts systematically underestimate the military's role in CCP succession. Consider:
Hua Guofeng (1976): Survived only with Marshal Ye Jianying's protection
Deng Xiaoping (1978-89): Consolidated power through military allies like Admiral Liu Huaqing
Jiang Zemin (1989): Required PLA backing after Tiananmen
Xi Jinping (2012): Father's military legacy provided crucial early support
The PLA's leverage is greater now because Xi has weakened alternative civilian power centers. Key open-source indicators:
Recent CMC vice-chair promotions coinciding with loyalist political rises
Coordinated coverage of PLA and PSC figures in PLA Daily during Party events
Insider Detail: Southern Theater Command Rotations
The Southern Theater oversees Taiwan operations. Its top command is not shuffled lightly, and when it is, the timing matters. The most recent rotation came in July 2024, when General Wu Yanan took over. While more than a year before the October 2025 plenum, it fits a long‑observed pattern in which politically sensitive commands are realigned well ahead of leadership transitions. In PLA political signaling, early moves can be as telling as last‑minute changes, especially when they coincide with Taiwan readiness milestones.
The Age Trap
Xi faces an impossible demographic puzzle.
This creates three unpalatable options:
Choose an older heir → Short tenure, potential instability
Elevate a younger outsider → Higher coup risk, factional resistance
Extend his own tenure → Succession crisis merely postponed
Economic Factors
China’s economic headwinds could accelerate succession:
Property sector crisis threatens systemic stability.
Record youth unemployment risks social unrest.
Local government debt constrains stimulus.
These pressures could force the PSC to elevate technocrats with fiscal credibility.
Insider Detail: Provincial Debt Time Bombs
Open-source provincial budget reports reveal the depth of the problem:
Heilongjiang: 46% of all government revenue now goes to debt service
Liaoning: Debt-to-GDP ratio has reached 89%
Guizhou: Local government financing vehicle debt exceeds 120% of provincial GDP
Note: Figures for Heilongjiang are cited in aggregate from government and media sources.
These numbers are more than economic trivia; they are political tripwires. The worse they get, the more unattractive loyalist candidates become compared to technocrats who can plausibly manage a crisis.
The Successor Shuffle Phenomenon
Historical pattern analysis reveals strongmen rarely stick with the first choice:
Mao's Carousel:
Liu Shaoqi (purged 1968)
Lin Biao (died fleeing in 1971)
Wang Hongwen (arrested 1976)
Hua Guofeng (marginalized 1978)
Deng's Iterations:
Hu Yaobang (ousted 1987)
Zhao Ziyang (purged 1989)
Jiang Zemin (survived through adaptability)
Xi may follow this pattern, using “succession uncertainty” as a management tool.
Anti-Corruption Legacy
Xi’s purges have left a smaller pool of “clean” candidates, most from his network. Even a hint of past investigation can be fatal to succession prospects.
Taiwan 2027 Directive
Xi's directive for PLA readiness on Taiwan by 2027 creates a moving deadline:
Success → Xi retires as unifier
Stalemate → Successor inherits crisis
Diplomatic resolution → Technocrat takes over
Status quo → Delay transition
This timeline could force Xi to stay through 2027, or exit immediately after.
4. Current Signals & Speculation (Mid‑2025)
The strongest signal comes from the Central Military Commission itself: new vice chair appointments are historically the most reliable predictor of succession maneuvering, and recent PLA realignments suggest something is moving behind the scenes.
Beyond military indicators, Xi's reduced public visibility tells a story. Provincial inspection tours have dropped significantly, state media appearances have decreased, and he has missed several high-profile events. Li Qiang, meanwhile, has taken on a more prominent international role at economic forums, the kind of exposure typically reserved for leadership grooming.
Adding to this volatility, the sudden disappearances of senior diplomats Liu Jianchao (head of the CCP International Liaison Department) and Sun Haiyan (vice foreign minister) in August 2025 have deepened the atmosphere of uncertainty. While the official explanations remain vague, the simultaneous sidelining of two high-ranking figures in China’s diplomatic hierarchy underscores the instability of Xi’s inner circle. In CCP politics, unexplained absences at this level are rarely coincidental; they often signal behind-the-scenes struggles, disciplinary probes, or factional maneuvering. Whether linked to foreign policy failures, elite mistrust, or succession maneuvering, these disappearances reinforce a central truth: in moments of Party fragility, it is the PLA’s stability and command of coercive power that ultimately decide outcomes.
Insider Detail – Leadership Photo Protocol Shifts
In the first half of 2025, People’s Daily quietly altered how Politburo Standing Committee members are pictured in group shots. Li Qiang now appears directly beside Xi in more images, a subtle elevation in visual hierarchy that state media has historically used to signal rising political importance.
More subtle but equally telling: there are reports of cuts to Xi's personal security detail. The removal of Xi Zhongxun's name from a Shaanxi memorial site may seem symbolic, but in Chinese politics, symbolism is strategy.
Rumor Mill Activity
Health speculation linking missed events to medical procedures
Reports of scaled‑back personal security detail
Think tank chatter about “managed transition” scenarios, including possible re‑emergence of reform‑minded figures like Wang Yang
Diplomatic sources are noting “preparatory briefings” for leadership change
Why Analysts Are Watching
These signals have coincided in time, prompting some observers to wonder if they are connected. Think tank analysts (Asia Society) and media reports (including New York Post) have floated scenarios involving leadership reshuffles or rotations.
Caution on Interpretation
Health rumors about Chinese leaders are common and often unfounded
PLA personnel changes occur regularly; without corroboration, they can be over‑interpreted
Symbolic acts can be politically loaded but may also have mundane administrative causes
Some of the sources amplifying these claims lean toward speculative commentary
Bottom Line
These developments are worth noting as possible early indicators of change, but they do not yet constitute firm evidence of an impending transition. For now, they belong in the “indicators to watch” column, to be weighed against longer‑term structural and factional dynamics. The uptick fits the broader “rumor ecology” pattern, which often reflects elite anxiety more than imminent change. Still, the convergence of multiple indicators warrants attention.
The Fourth Plenum Wild Card
What is a CCP Plenum? A plenum is a full meeting of the Central Committee, typically held annually. These gatherings set policy agendas and occasionally announce leadership changes. The Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (October 2025) will officially focus on the 15th Five‑Year Plan (2026‑2030) but could also be a venue for succession signaling.
Historical plenums that changed everything:
Third Plenum, 11th CC (1978): Deng's reform launch.
Fourth Plenum, 13th CC (1989): Jiang's elevation post‑Tiananmen.
Sixth Plenum, 18th CC (2016): Xi's “core leader” designation.
5. The Three Scenarios: Probability Matrix
Here are three plausible post-Xi pathways, the leading contenders, and the triggers that could set each in motion, based on factional strength, historical precedent, crisis dynamics, and PLA alignment.
Scenario 1: Managed Continuity (~50%)
Xi orchestrates a controlled handover to a loyalist, ensuring ideological and policy continuity.
How it happens:
Gradual elevation of chosen successor to CMC vice-chair
Increased media visibility for the heir apparent
Xi potentially retains CMC chairmanship initially (Deng model)
Link to PLA movements:
Link to PLA movements: Echoing the July 2024 Southern Theater rotation, sensitive commands are often stabilized ahead of leadership transitions to secure loyalty.
Historical parallel:
Deng to Jiang transition (1989-1997)
Key indicators:
Li Qiang given more autonomous policy portfolios
Ding Xuexiang elevated to executive vice premier
State media begins subtle "grooming" coverage
Triggers:
Planned retirement, health, formal blessing
Prediction:
If no CMC vice-chair grooming is visible by the end of 2026, the probability of this scenario drops sharply.
Scenario 2: Technocratic Transition (~30%)
Economic or geopolitical pressures force the Party to prioritize competence over loyalty.
How it happens:
Major economic crisis demands expertise
International isolation requires a diplomatic reset
Climate/environmental catastrophe elevates technical leaders
Historical parallel:
Zhu Rongji's rise during the Asian Financial Crisis
Key indicators:
Chen Jining fast-tracked to PSC
Reform-minded figures like Wang Yang resurface
Policy documents emphasize "scientific governance"
Triggers:
Economic crisis, policy failure, elite consensus
Prediction:
If property sector defaults exceed 20% of GDP by mid‑2026, the likelihood of technocratic elevation rises above 50%.
Scenario 3: Factional Compromise (~20%)
Sudden leadership vacuum forces a hasty deal between competing factions.
How it happens:
Unexpected Xi incapacitation
Military intervention in deadlock
External crisis requiring immediate response
Historical parallel:
Hua Guofeng’s elevation after Mao (1976)
Key indicators:
Unusual Central Committee emergency session
Military movements around Beijing
Diplomatic channels report "uncertainty"
Triggers:
Sudden exit, elite deadlock, external shock
Prediction:
If Xi misses two consecutive major Party events without clear grooming signals, the probability of this scenario jumps above 40%.
Methodology Behind the Probabilities
These estimates draw from:
Factional strength: Current PSC balance between Xi loyalists, technocrats, and reformists.
Historical precedent weighting: Outcomes of past leadership transitions since 1978.
Structural indicators: Age norms, tenure patterns, and cadre promotion signals.
Crisis vs. stability dynamics: CCP behavior in leadership vacuums.
Military alignment: degree of PLA support or neutrality for each candidate
Each factor was qualitatively scored and weighted according to its predictive value in past transitions, and the final percentages reflect the composite score from this process.
Limitations:
Black swan events (health crises, Taiwan conflict, economic collapse) could invalidate all scenarios within days. CCP decision-making is highly opaque, and sudden shocks could radically alter the succession calculus.
6. The Watchlist: Next 18 Months
Personnel Moves
CMC appointments: New vice-chairs signal succession grooming (→ favors Managed Continuity if loyalist; could also signal Factional Compromise if cross‑factional).
PLA-linked promotions: Especially to CMC vice chair roles (→ strong Managed Continuity indicator). The 2024 Southern Theater reshuffle is one such precedent.
Provincial reshuffles: Rapid promotions for younger cadres to PSC track (→ favors Technocratic Transition or Factional Compromise).
Ministry changes: Economic portfolios handed to technocrats (→ favors Technocratic Transition).
Symbolic Shifts & Public Appearances
Media treatment: Subtle changes in leadership coverage hierarchy (→ scenario depends on who is spotlighted).
Ideological campaigns: Intensity indicates Xi's grip strength (→ sustained high intensity favors Managed Continuity).
Historical narratives: Rehabilitation of past leaders can signal factional direction shifts (→ could favor Technocratic or Compromise).
Public appearances: Xi’s unexplained absences or reduced schedule (→ favors Managed Continuity if grooming evident; otherwise Compromise).
Policy Pivots
Economic liberalization: “Markets over Marx” language suggests technocratic influence (→ favors Technocratic Transition).
Diplomatic thaws: Outreach to West (→ favors Technocratic Transition).
Military doctrine: Adjustments to Taiwan timeline reveal succession impact (→ shortened timeline may favor Managed Continuity; lengthened may favor Compromise or Technocratic).
Procedural Moves & Major Meetings
Unscheduled plenums or term-limit rule changes (→ favors Managed Continuity if extending loyalists’ terms).
Major Party meetings: The October 2025 Fourth Plenum is a key venue for leadership signaling or formal announcements (→ especially relevant for Managed Continuity or Compromise).
Crisis Responses
Economic shocks: Who leads the response reveals real power structure (→ technocrat in charge favors Technocratic Transition).
Natural disasters: Crisis management roles may indicate succession preparation.
International incidents: Diplomatic handling exposes factional balance.
Elite Signaling & Rumor Ecology
Elite signaling: State media “model cadre” features can elevate contenders.
Rumor intensity: Spikes in coup/succession rumors may reflect heightened tension even if details are unreliable.
7. The Global Stakes
Xi’s succession will be the most consequential leadership change in China since Deng Xiaoping stepped back in the early 1990s. It will decide whether China doubles down on Xi‑era centralization and ideological rigor, pivots toward pragmatic technocracy, or navigates a compromise born of crisis.
For observers, this is beyond simple palace intrigue; it is the pivot point for China’s economic policy, foreign relations, and domestic governance for the next decade. Whether a successor continues Xi’s project or moves toward reform will hinge on three factors:
PLA alignment: securing military backing or at least neutrality.
Political base: strength within the Party and across factions.
Consolidation speed: the first 18 months will determine their staying power.
US–China competition will shape the choice:
A hawkish US posture could strengthen loyalists and hardliners.
A dovish engagement strategy might embolden pragmatists and technocrats.
Past transitions - Jiang’s rise in 1989 and Hu’s in 2002 - both coincided with recalibrations in the bilateral relationship.
For China
Economic model: State capitalism vs. market reforms.
Political trajectory: Continued personalization vs. institutional governance.
Social contract: Prosperity focus vs. ideological mobilization.
For the World
US–China relations: Cold War 2.0 vs. managed competition.
Global economy: Decoupling acceleration vs. reintegration.
Regional security: Taiwan timeline, South China Sea posture.
Technology competition: AI/semiconductor race dynamics.
Climate cooperation: Paris Agreement commitment levels.
For Investors
Market liberalization prospects.
Foreign company treatment.
Capital flow restrictions.
RMB internationalization pace.
For US National Security
PLA leverage: If the PLA acts as kingmaker, expect a harder security line on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and military modernization regardless of successor.
Technocrat rise: A technocratic successor could prioritize economic stabilization, potentially opening narrow windows for trade and climate engagement.
Factional compromise: A compromise leader chosen in crisis may face early instability, raising risks of unpredictable foreign policy moves and escalatory behavior.
8. The Bottom Line
As of mid‑2025, Managed Continuity remains the most probable path (50%), with Li Qiang or Ding Xuexiang as leading contenders. But Xi's hyper‑personalized system creates fragility; the very mechanisms preventing premature succession also complicate an orderly transition.
The October 2025 Plenum looms as a potential inflection point. Watch for subtle signals: personnel elevations, policy shifts, and especially PLA alignments. The successor may already be chosen, but in the CCP's opaque system, nothing is certain until the red flag is raised.
In Chinese politics, the question isn't just who but when and how. Xi's successor will inherit not just offices but the fundamental question of China's direction: whether to double down on Xi Jinping Thought or pivot toward pragmatic governance. That choice will echo far beyond Zhongnanhai's red walls.
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