Narrative Warfare in Print: China, Ukraine, and the Future of Influence
What a Chinese scholar’s quiet essay reveals about Beijing’s strategy - and why the West must read between the lines.
In July 2025, Foreign Affairs published a nuanced essay by Chinese scholar Da Wei on Beijing’s position toward the war in Ukraine. On the surface, the article reads as balanced and analytical, highlighting China’s ambivalence, critiquing Russia, and stressing restraint. But beneath its calm prose lies something far more strategic.
This two-part analysis dissects why this message was sent and why it matters. Da Wei’s essay is not just a scholarly intervention; it is a carefully calibrated signal. It rehearses China’s posture for future conflicts, undermines transatlantic unity, and exploits narrative asymmetries that favor authoritarian influence. Its real utility lies not in what it says about Ukraine, but in what it reveals about how China intends to compete: quietly, and over time.
Part I: Why Da Wei Wrote This Essay, And Why It Matters
1. From Think Tank to Strategic Mouthpiece
Da Wei is not "just" an academic. He directs the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, one of China’s most politically embedded and influential policy research institutions. While Da is not a CCP official, his published views track closely with the contours of Party-state thinking, even when couched in the language and posture of independent analysis.
It's essential to recognize that, though China’s political system is authoritarian, its foreign policy discourse is not monolithic. Scholars like Da Wei operate within a bounded intellectual space: robust debate and genuine differences exist, but always within parameters defined by party priorities and political risk. This curated pluralism is a feature of the system, not a flaw, providing the state with a way to test policy lines, float trial balloons, and calibrate external messaging, all while maintaining discipline over the master narrative.
Da Wei’s writing, especially when placed in influential Western venues, fits into a broader pattern of strategic communication long cultivated by Chinese officialdom.
China doesn’t speak through editorials the way the US State Department does. Instead, it signals through layers: Track II scholars, "semi-authoritative" commentary in Party-aligned media, white papers, and then formal statements. Da’s article fits into this model of deliberate ambiguity plus elite messaging. Its appearance in Foreign Affairs isn’t coincidental; it’s tactical.
2. Foreign Affairs as Information Battlefield
Publishing in Foreign Affairs is a direct channel to the minds of US and European elites. It is where the American foreign policy establishment goes to define consensus and challenge orthodoxy. For Chinese strategists, it offers a unique opportunity: to influence the influencers, shape perceptions at the top, and test narratives without risk.
Da Wei’s article does just that. It:
Frames China as a restrained actor in a messy world.
Hints at internal debate (appealing to Western faith in “moderates.”)
Positions Beijing as principled and peace-seeking, in contrast to a reactive West.
This is elite persuasion by design, targeting not hawks but centrists and “responsible stakeholder” realists in Foggy Bottom, Brussels, and Berlin.
3. Narrative Shaping as Strategic Experimentation
Da Wei characterizes China's approach to Ukraine as "ambivalent." That word is doing a lot of work. In PLA doctrine, this fits into what is known as “cognitive domain operations”, or efforts to shape the information space before, during, and after kinetic activity. As Lectures on Joint Campaign Information Operations puts it, the goal is to condition elite reactions before the crisis begins.
By describing China's Ukraine stance as neutral and pragmatic, Da Wei is:
Normalizing non-intervention in great power war.
Floating Beijing as a future mediator without costs.
Softening the image of Chinese strategic opportunism.
This prepares the information ground for the next crisis - perhaps in the Taiwan Strait - when analysts will recall “the reasonable voice” Da Wei once published.
4. How This Fits the PLA’s Influence Playbook
This article is a case study in Three Warfares doctrine:
Public Opinion Warfare: Framing China in the global mind as a moderate force.
Psychological Warfare: Sowing doubt and division in Western consensus.
Legal Warfare: Anchoring China’s inaction in terms of sovereignty and neutrality.
It also reflects the PLA’s doctrine of “active defense,” e.g., shape the terrain, influence perceptions, and delay kinetic commitments until the conditions are ripe. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy makes clear that these concepts are not just academic, but integrated into operational planning.
In this telling, China is the adult in the room. America is reactive, emotional, overextended. Russia is dangerous, but understandable. Europe is confused. Only China, Da suggests, is thoughtful and balanced. Narrative warfare at its finest.
5. Virtue as Camouflage: Mencian Signaling with CCP Characteristics
Da Wei’s tone channels the Confucian ethic of moral diplomacy; reason over force, moderation over extremes. This aligns with Mencius’ principle of winning through virtue (以德服人).
But make no mistake: this is not traditional moral persuasion. It’s strategic virtue-signaling. China appears thoughtful and restrained to:
Deflate Western pressure for confrontation.
Elevate the political cost of excluding Beijing from future negotiations.
Accrue reputational capital without direct commitment.
This is diplomacy with a scalpel, not a hammer.
6. Narrative Asymmetry and Intellectual Diplomacy
Da Wei’s piece capitalizes on a persistent asymmetry: US scholars routinely engage with Chinese discourse, publish in Chinese journals, and attend Chinese-hosted dialogues, but the reverse is rare. Most Western audiences will never access the original Chinese-language sources shaping PRC foreign policy, to include white papers, internal strategy documents, and Party speeches.
By placing his analysis in Foreign Affairs, Da inserts Beijing’s preferred framing directly into elite Western debate without exposing China’s internal narratives to equivalent scrutiny.
This is not traditional public diplomacy. It is strategic messaging by design; a form of influence that shapes elite perception while maintaining narrative control at home and denying it abroad. It requires no formal authorization, just strategic placement, and it works best when unexamined.
7. Read the Piece, but Read Between the Lines
Da Wei’s Foreign Affairs essay is well-written, nuanced, and seemingly moderate. But the act of publishing it, and its precise tone, placement, and timing, are as important as its content. His article is more than regular analysis; it’s a carefully staged, calibrated, and timed strategic act. It’s part message, part maneuver, laying groundwork for longer-term strategic effects:
A probe into Western psychological terrain.
A bid for postwar influence.
A rehearsal for future conflict narratives.
If US and allied policymakers take the essay at face value, they risk missing the quiet effectiveness of China’s long-game persuasion. Understanding the messaging beneath the message is no longer optional in the era of systemic competition. It is the contest.
Part II: What US Strategists Must Learn from China’s Ukraine Messaging
While many read Da Wei’s article as a detached analysis of Ukraine, the subtext is more instructive and more dangerous. Under the surface of this calm prose lies a series of disquieting signals for US national security professionals, many of which remain under-analyzed in the mainstream policy conversation.
These are the implications national security leaders cannot ignore.
1. Beijing is Field-Testing Neutrality as a Strategic Tool
China's studied "neutrality" in the Russia-Ukraine war is experimentation, not indecision. As Da Wei explains, Beijing seeks to maintain flexibility, avoid Western entanglements, and minimize reputational damage with Europe while still benefiting from Russia’s isolation. This points to a model of calibrated ambiguity - a form of “neutrality with benefits” - that could be replicated elsewhere.
Why It Matters:
China is developing a diplomatic template that erodes Western cohesion without committing to costly alliances.
Strategic neutrality could weaken sanctions regimes, slow crisis response, or dilute multilateral alignment through plausible deniability.
This ambiguity, if normalized, could become a disruptive default posture in other contested regions.
2. A Division-of-Labor Axis with Russia Is Taking Shape
Though Da Wei downplays the China-Russia alignment, their respective postures suggest a de facto division of labor: Russia destabilizes; China benefits. Military friction caused by Moscow distracts and depletes Western focus, which Beijing then leverages diplomatically or economically.
Why It Matters:
China and Russia are coordinating effects, if not plans, requiring a broader lens than bilateral contingencies.
This model lowers the threshold for collaboration: no joint doctrines needed, just complementary disruption.
US planners must track multi-theater, asymmetric disruption across elections, gray zone ops, and third-party crises, not in isolation, but as part of a loose authoritarian ecosystem.
3. China's Long Game Still Includes Europe, Just Not the Way the West Expects
Da Wei affirms China’s interest in positive ties with Europe but omits a key truth: China does not need Europe aligned with it, only not aligned with Washington. The Ukraine war allows Beijing to encourage “strategic autonomy” and cultivate economic relationships without overt confrontation.
Why It Matters:
Beijing seeks a form of “de-coupled cohesion”: economic interdependence with Europe despite strategic divergence.
Transatlantic unity forged in Ukraine won’t necessarily extend to China, unless Washington deliberately builds the bridge.
Washington must invest in long-term convergence with the EU on values, tech standards, security, and information resilience beyond the Ukraine theater.
4. The PRC Views Ukraine as a Simulation for Taiwan
China’s muted reaction to Russia’s invasion should be seen not as passivity, but as strategic observation. Ukraine offers a live scenario to study Western escalation thresholds, sanctions fatigue, and alliance durability.
Why It Matters:
Beijing is war-gaming escalation ladders and red lines, using Ukraine as a proxy to refine Taiwan deterrence strategies.
The true measure isn’t Western unity in 2022; it’s cohesion and stamina in year five and beyond.
The US must incorporate a longer time horizon for strategic competition, matching China’s patience with durable resolve.
5. The PLA May Never Fire a Shot to Benefit from a War
Da Wei hints at China's possible role in postwar Ukraine diplomacy. The deeper signal: China can extract strategic value from conflict it never joins by positioning itself for post-conflict influence.
Why It Matters:
China is preparing to be a postwar broker or economic beneficiary even as it avoids direct engagement.
Future conflicts may see China push for influence at peace tables where it shares no cost.
US planners should bind post-conflict leverage to contributions, denying Beijing a free diplomatic ride while encouraging other fence-sitting powers to engage meaningfully.
6. Strategic Recommendations: Compete in the Cognitive Domain
These patterns aren’t theoretical. They’re already shaping how Beijing manages global crises. To remain competitive, US and allied strategy must respond with equal subtlety and greater resolve.
Elevate China-focused consultations within NATO and EU forums, ensuring that Ukraine-related coordination preempts Chinese diplomatic triangulation.
Deploy narrative inoculation in the Global South by leveraging partnerships with countries like Indonesia and Brazil, highlighting China’s silent alignment with Russia through examples like dual-use tech transfers or pro-Kremlin disinfo amplification.
Red-team PRC diplomatic positions in scenarios like a Taiwan Strait blockade, an Arctic sovereignty dispute, or a Gulf crisis, anticipating how China might posture as a neutral mediator while shielding revisionist partners.
Push back on China’s claims to postwar influence by conditioning economic access or diplomatic privileges on measurable contributions to conflict resolution.
Invest in resilience-based competition, focusing not on confrontation but long-term stamina: supply chains, sanctions enforcement, alliance cohesion, and democratic credibility.
Conclusion: Competing with a Civilization Built on Patience
To paraphrase Xi Jinping, China must “play chess with a long view.” Da Wei’s article is one such move: subtle, deliberate, and strategically placed.
It rehearses Beijing’s playbook for future crises, conditions elite opinion, and exploits every gap in Western unity without raising its voice.
This is the new shape of competition: not loud or obvious, but constant and deeply strategic. Ignoring it would be a mistake of equal subtlety, and far greater consequence.
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